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Good morning. I’m sorry, I didn’t mean to startle you. Allow me to introduce
myself. I am Dr. Ruben Sabio of the Potosi Chapter of the Bolivian Academy
of Arts and Letters. I shall be explaining to you the changes that have occurred.
Although you’ve only slept for nine years, a short time as these episodes go, in
that brief interval the millennium has arrived. No, not the chronological one,
for it is only 1999, but rather the social, political and economic millennium.
In some ways life hasn’t changed. The daily hustle-bustle is still with us. We
still have disputes to resolve. Raising children is still a challenge. Always will
be. But now, at least, the little ones are all well fed, even here on the Bolivian
altiplano. We still have quarrels about local budgets and zoning regulations. No
one expected a Utopia and we sure don’t have one, but no one is nostalgic for
the bad old days. Of course, the romanticized old days is quite another matter
or rather business. Our harvest festival, with its colorful Indian ceremonies,
attracts many tourists and the resulting revenues provide an extra measure of
discretionary expenditure for our region. And our language schools for local
and foreign students of Aymara are always filled to capacity.
How it came about is a subject of heated debate. In truth, although it is contrary
to our local claims, I believe that it was a consequence of a conjunction of things;
different reasons in different places, but who am I to say? After all, five of our
local scholars are doing doctoral dissertations on this very topic. For us and
many others in the Third World, it was exasperation with the debt problem —
there had to be a different way.
For many of the industrialized countries, the frustration centered on the lim-
itations on effective national action resulting from globalization of economic
activity. The necessity to compete with low cost imports brought the welfare
state under attack in all of the industrialized countries. Thorstein Veblen put it
very well when he observed that nationalism was the tool of the vested interests,
while the well-being of the common person was aligned with global unity. 1 In
fact, more and more of the vested interests saw the pecuniary advantages to
be gained from a global perspective and they, too, abandoned nationalism as
bad business. 2 Fortunately humanity was able to seize the day and make the
necessary reforms before it was too late.
Agreement was reached for a new Bretton Woods conference, but a funny thing
happened along the way. Like glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union,
once a snowball begins rolling downhill, control is lost. Environmental activists
approached their governments and insisted that the interconnectedness of e-
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conomy and environment required that the agenda be broadened. Indeed, the
survival of life on this planet required more than the recommendations of finance
ministers and central bank presidents. As it turned out, virtually everyone was
heard. In the year preceding the initial global summit, discussions were virtu-
ally endless: teach-ins, town meetings, radio talk shows, conferences — every
imaginable format in every corner of the globe.
Two of the changes on which consensus was reached long before the summit
even took place were for the establishment of a system of global taxation and
for a single world currency — not a centrally created reserve asset like the SDR,
but a circulating currency which would replace all national monies. You may
recall that well over a century ago John Stuart Mill had observed that only the
current state of barbarism led nations to insist, to their own disadvantage and
that of their neighbors, on maintaining separate currencies. 3 In the early 1990s,
the perpetuation of that barbarism was judged collectively to be intolerable.
Under the old order, the erratic behavior of foreign exchange markets reached
the point at which exchange rates no longer served a useful role in guiding re-
source allocation. Rather than providing a reliable signal for production choices,
exchange rate variability became a resource-absorbing activity in and of itself.
No major corporation was without a large foreign currency division, corporate
officers often spent as much time debating exchange rate strategy as they did
output and pricing decisions, and exchange dealers sprang up like mushrooms
in the principal cities of the world. It was a giant casino with a daily volume of
foreign exchange transactions in the late 1980s which was well over one hundred
times my country’s annual gross domestic product.
Politics always makes strange bedfellows. The broad support for various changes
took everyone by surprise. Few, it would seem, saw any point in continuing the
divisive nation-based arrangements. Even the international private banks joined
the bandwagon. Despite their inflated profits, their officers had suffered chronic
insomnia for years over debt exposure and exchange rate volatility. When the
banks saw the prospect of no longer being harassed by the Lilliputians (for
that is how they viewed the nation-states), they worked out far larger debt
writedowns than had previously been offered, as a concrete indication of their
stake in the proposed reforms.
A conceptual key to the introduction of global taxation and income redistribu-
tion was the notion of the common heritage of humankind. Not, however, the
1970s version of the common heritage, which was limited to res nullius — the
property of nobody. In the very forum in which the notion of common heritage
was being frequently invoked in those years, a great sea grab took place assign-
ing resources not in proportion to need, but rather in proportion to length of
coastline and the richness of the resources located there. 4
As territorial claims were extended in one way or another, the notion was
rethought: a moment’s reflection would tell us that virtually the entire world
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we live in is based on a common heritage: written and spoken langauge, the
food we eat, the clothes we wear, the very thoughts we think, not to mention
the technological building blocks in the machines that surround us. The notion
of common heritage doubtlessly had been applied primarily to seabed resources
as a domain over which prior claims of sovereignty and property rights had not
yet been established. But property rights themselves are part of our common
heritage. The historical accident of national boundaries having been drawn
should not justify denying to the bulk of the world’s population a share in the
monetary gains resulting from the harnessing of our common heritage.
Once the perspective was broadened, our common heritage appeared to be u-
biquitous: international public goods, among which are peace, freedom of the
seas and an open trading system, were also spoken of as part of our common
heritage. 5 And Pablo Neruda acknowledged another dimension of the common
heritage, when he spoke of his indebtedness to Walt Whitman. 6 We are all in-
debted in a myriad of ways and we all derive gain by standing on the shoulders
of others.
With the acceptance of the notion of the common heritage, came the heritage
dividend, a guaranteed income under a different name: a share of the profits
derived from the application of our ”joint stock of knowledge.” One-third of
the dividend was specifically earmarked for the provision of basic needs to the
lowest strata of the income distribution.
Intellectual limbo was already well-populated by dozens of proposed global tax-
es, dating all the way back to the late- nineteenth century. 7 These were dusted
off and discussed with enthusiasm and several were eventually adopted, among
them taxes on transactions which benefit directly from the existence of interna-
tional order.
As important as the idea of the common heritage was to the organizational
changes that were introduced, the sense of our having a very much threatened
common future 8 served as a rallying point for the intense grassroots pressures
for change. The concern that there might well be no future for life on Earth
led to a challenge to all assumptions and a reexamination of all institutional
arrangements. ”We’ve always done things that way” was no longer an effective
response to the quite persistent demands for a saner society. Paradoxically, there
was both conservatism and revolution. Perhaps, after all, the proper answer to
the question ”either/or” is always ”both/and.” Many traditions were preserved
and invigorated, while others were rescued from disuse. Practices that were
essentially benign were generally unchallenged, while those which gave a sense
of purpose, place, or fulfilment were promoted.
Sovereignty? What a cruel joke that was under the old order. We were, as the
saying goes, free to be poor: the nation, that is, and most of us individually.
You know what monetary sovereignty meant for us? We knocked nine zeros off
our currency between 1960 and 1985. Some record, don’t you think? We were
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free to impose exchange controls and watch helplessly as capital left the country
illegally in amounts that more than offset increases in export earnings, foreign
aid, private investment inflows, and borrowing. We were free to have massive
devaluations, which substantially raised the local currency price of imported
foodstuffs and capital goods.
Little good it did us to have a distinct currency. In the older order our currency,
the boliviano, enslaved and impoverished us. The very idea that nations have
equal capacities 9 blinding us to the enfeeblement that the symbols of so-called
sovereignty produced. Giving up monetary policy was a blessing for us. There is
indeed little that we need to achieve that can’t be achieved with fiscal measures
or with administrative action. 10 Think about it: California was said to be the
world’s sixth largest economy and yet it had no currency, no central bank and
no monetary policy. So why should Bolivia, Gabon, and Papua-New Guinea
have central banks? Indeed, why should the United States and West Germany
in today’s world? The original rationale for the existence of the multi-bank
U.S. Federal Reserve System as opposed to a single central bank was that there
was to have been regionally differentiated monetary policy. The possibility of
cable transfers made that a dead letter even prior to the inauguration of the
system. Similarly, today’s instantaneous world-wide communications combined
with financial markets on which the Sun never sets cried out for an end to
separate currencies and the pretence of monetary independence.
The elimination of central bank printing presses and currency devaluation brought
us stability. It knocked most of the props out from under the rent-seeking soci-
ety. Some years ago an estimate was made that the windfall gains flowing from
administrative controls amounted to one-sixth of Turkey’s national product. 11
I haven’t seen the estimates being prepared by the many researchers participat-
ing in the writing of the economic history of the old order, but I wouldn’t doubt
that the share in Bolivia was at least double that. If one is looking for a key
to understanding the extreme skewing of the income distribution and for what
kept us poor, that is certainly an important element.
Part of the proceeds of the new global taxes earmarked for Bolivia were set
aside for remaining debt payments. Even so, we received at the onset of the
new system the net equivalent of $250 per head, which was almost one-third
of our previous per capita income. We already receive through international
revenue transfers far more per capita than we had ever been able to raise before
through taxes.
One important feature of the new order is that those countries whose govern-
ments had not been chosen by free elections have their transfers reduced by
one-half. The funds held back become available for gradual disbursement once
democratic practices are established. That approach was based on the Euro-
pean Community’s practice of insisting on democratic elections as a prerequisite
for membership. Would that the United States had been so unequivocal about
democracy overseas as the world now is, thanks to the European example.
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I hope that I am not conveying the impression that the heavy hand of uniformity
and centralization descended on the face of the Earth. Quite the contrary: from
many different quarters came variants of what the European Community called
the ”principle of subsidiarity,” i.e., functions should reside at the lowest level
at which they can be efficiently performed. You know, of course, that our
own government in La Paz, like so many in Latin America, tried with great
frustration and little success to manage everything. In fact, as I’ve intimated, it
rarely had a sufficient respite from chronic foreign exchange crises to give much
attention to other pressing matters. Today, regional and local governments,
with taxing powers as well as transfer receipts, are responding directly to the
needs of the people.
One example to illustrate my point about diversity. When all is said and done,
home is where the heart is: although we always supported, to no avail, proposals
for braindrain taxes, we much prefer to have our trained and skilled Bolivians
back at home. As democracy, stability, and hope grounded in events came to
Bolivia, many of our compatriots returned, much enriched financially and in
experience. At first they were something of a pain, with their computers and
FAX machines. They complained bitterly about the frequent power failures
and inadequacies of the telephone network. Indeed one distinguished Bolivian
physicist conditioned his return on being able to maintain his global network of
colleagues. With the help and prodding of those who returned, we have jumped
to the technological frontier.
Which brings me to jobs. Curious how warped our old viewpoints were. By
regarding the nation as the unit of analysis, all problems had to be ”resolved”
within the context of the nation state. Resolved? — a curious notion. What
is resolved by subsidizing smokestack industries? We were burdening ourselves
financially, the acid rain was destroying our forests and the spent fuel was warm-
ing the earth. For what? A handful of jobs. Don’t misunderstand me, people
have to be active, involved, self- actualized, and, let us not forget, adequately
compensated. And they are now. Of course the public sector — local, regional,
national and international — is a major employer. Right here in Potosi, we have
several thousand people with new jobs in oral history projects, in compilation
and interpretation of Aymara folksongs and legends, in environmental monitor-
ing and cleanup, in restoration and animal habitats, and in the architectural
and technical studies necessary for opening our major theme park: the Spanish
colonial silver mines. Imagine, visitors will be able to descend into the mines in
mule-drawn carts and actually chip away a piece of ore containing silver.
But I digress. In fact, employment in marketed services continues to grow
every year: publishing, local radio and television, the arts, information services,
professional sports all absorb large numbers. We have creased to be obsessed
with jobs in industry, with the tax competition between countries that went
with it. Why worry if the world ’chooses’ to produce all of its VCRs in Japan
or Malaysia? 12 If we can share in the profits from that activity, it certainly
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is no loss to us. We focus instead on income levels and on human satisfaction.
Work is very much still with us, but we have tried to minimize drudgery and
toil.
By taking steps to abandon arrangements that had heretofore been thought of as
essential to national sovereignty, we paradoxically enhanced sovereignty rather
than weakened it. We are free now to cultivate our differences and even profit
handsomely from them. The quest to replicate within our national boundaries
the industrial structure of Great Britain or even Belgium has given way to the
celebration of individual creativity. Tax funds that were previously given away
to attract high-cost, low-volume uncompetitive industries are now available for
health care and for cultural and educational activities, among other things.
People are now able to resolve many of their own problems at the village level.
For us, the new order has truly brought what previously seemed inconceivable:
self-reliant development in an integrating world. So you see, I don’t have any
nostalgia for the bygone ways.
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